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Course Description and Scope

This course offers graduate-level contract theory and information economics. It provides lectures on important topics in the field including contract theory and mechanism design. We will also have presentations of some of key papers in the area. A partial list can be found below.

References

Bolton and Dewatripont *Contract Theory*
Salanie *Economics of Contracts*
Laffont and Martimort *Theory of Incentives*
Mas-Collel, Whinston and Green *Microeconomic Theory*
Borgers Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

Papers

Myerson (1981) Optimal auction design, *Mathematics of Operations Research* **6**, 58-73
Myerson (1982) Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, **10**, 67-81
Holmstrom (1982) Maral hazard in teams, *Bell Journal of Economics* **13**: 324-340
Grossman, S. and Hart, O. (1999), The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration, *Journal of Political Economy*, **94**, 691-719.
Hart and Moore (1999) Property rights and the nature of the firm, *Journal of Political Economy* **98**, 1119-1158

Schedule

TBA

Course Assessment

Homework 10%
Presentation 45%
Final exam 45%

Office hours

By appointment